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Abstract
Our study compares individual and team bidding in standard auction formats: first-
price, second-price and ascending-price (English) auctions with independent private values.
In a laboratory experiment, we find that individuals overbid more than teams in first-price
auctions and deviate more from bidding their own value in second-price auctions. However
we observe no difference in bidding behavior in English auctions. Based on control variables,
we claim that the observed difference can be explained by better reasoning abilities of teams.
Emotions play a role in determining bids, but the effect of emotions on bidding does not differ
between individuals and teams.
JEL classifications: C91, C92, D44
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1 Introduction
Auctions are a very important allocation mechanism. In the theoretical and empirical literature,
bidders in auctions are usually assumed to be (representative) individuals. However, often, small
groups or teams (henceforth used interchangeably) determine bids or bidding strategies together
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(see, e.g., Börgers and Dustmann, 2005). Teams may be organized formally, potentially including
a hierarchy, or informally such as it is usually the case with families or teams of experts without
a formal structure.
Examples of bidding in teams readily come to mind. Think of a family that decides about
their bid in an online auction. However, also on the level of corporate auctions, teams play a
crucial role. In spectrum auctions (Abbink et al., 2005) or auctions for offshore oil leases, teams
of managers or experts (geologists) formulate strategies for bidding (Capen et al., 1971, Hoffman
et al., 1991). Interestingly, we know very little about the extent to which existing knowledge from
bidding behavior of individuals can be transferred to auctions that involve team bidders. One
reason is that the existing evidence, mostly from laboratory experiments, is not fully conclusive.
We discuss the relevant literature in greater detail below.
This paper, therefore, compares individual and team bidding in a systematic design. We
implement three commonly used auction formats: a first-price auction, a second-price auction,
and an ascending English auction. Using a laboratory experiment, we systematically vary the type
of decision maker by having either individuals or small unitary teams deciding about the bids. Our
focus is on unitary teams, i.e. teams that do not face an internal conflict in terms of monetary
outcomes and that have to come up with a joint decision after some deliberation. Obviously, team
decision settings are quite diverse outside the laboratory. However, unitary teams seem to provide
a good first impression of potential differences between individual decision makers and teams, and
more involved teams settings follow immediately as potential extensions.
It is well-known that individuals and small unitary teams differ in several respects (Charness
and Sutter, 2012, Kugler et al., 2012). First, individuals and teams differ in their ability to avoid
mistakes (Bornstein et al., 2004, Blinder and Morgan, 2005, Cooper and Kagel, 2005, Sutter, 2005,
Gillet et al., 2009, Feri et al., 2010) or in their learning ability and pace (Kocher and Sutter, 2005,
Kocher et al., 2006, Maciejovsky et al., 2013). According to the economists’ definition, teams
are thus usually more rational decision makers than individuals. Applying results from existing
studies using different decision making games would lead to the expectation of fewer instances of
overbidding in first-price auctions and of fewer deviations from the dominant strategy of bidding
one’s own valuation in second-price auctions.
Second, individuals and teams might potentially differ in the risks they take. There is a long
discussion starting in the early psychological literature about whether there is a “risky shift” from
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individuals to teams (Stoner, 1961) or whether the shift is actually “cautious” (Moscovici and
Zavalloni, 1969). Recent evidence from controlled laboratory experiments in economics provide
inconclusive results (Baker et al., 2008, Shupp and Williams, 2008, Masclet et al., 2009, Zhang and
Casari, 2012). Obviously, a difference in revealed risk attitudes from individuals and teams would
affect equilibrium bids in first-price auctions, not in second-price auctions.
Third, there could be a difference in the emotional reactions to events during an auction or
between auctions.1 Auction fever describes a non-rational immersion into an auction that might
lead to overbidding. There is large literature in social psychology showing that team decision
making might go out of hand and lead to even disastrous consequences. This literature that
is often summarized under the heading “groupthink” (Janis, 1972, 1982, 1989) has looked at
(often spectacular) misjudgments or failures that followed deliberation within teams. Usually,
groupthink goes hand in hand with some deficiencies in the group decision making process such
as the existence of a strong group leader together with the suppression of deviant opinions. While
there is no evidence yet, it is conceivable that groupthink could be related to emotional reactions
or over-competitive attitudes in auctions. Does auction fever perhaps affect individuals and teams
differently? Potential differential effects of auctions fever should be observable in ascending English
auctions.
Our list of potential influences on bidding in auctions that lead to differences between indi-
vidual bids and team bids is not exhaustive. There might be additional relevant aspects, but
those mentioned above are probably the most important ones. So far, the existing experimental
literature on bidding in auctions has almost exclusively focused on individual bidders. To the best
of our knowledge, there are only a few exceptions. Cox and Hayne (2006), the first paper on the
difference between individuals and teams in auctions, focus on the effect of information on team
bidding and less on a controlled comparison between individual and team bidders. They find that
more information in a common value auction environment makes teams less rational bidders than
individuals – an effect that they call “curse of information”. Indeed, such a curse could be related
to groupthink or over-competitiveness. Interestingly, Sutter et al. (2009) find a similar result in a
different framework. Their focus is on an ascending sealed-bid English auction with a private and
a common value component (with some resemblance to spectrum auction designs). They show
that teams stay significantly longer in the auction and that they also pay higher prices. As a
1See, for instance, Breaban and Noussair (2018) for an application of emotion measurement in experimental
asset markets.
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consequence, they make smaller profits and fall prey to the winner’s curse more often.2
We are not aware of any study on the differences between individual and team bids in the most
straightforward auction designs: sealed-bid first- and second-price auctions. We also implement
an ascending English auction. An important feature of our design is that we keep all aspects
equal across the individual treatments and the team treatments – hence, the bids in the auctions
formats can be compared directly. Our teams consist of three members that remain anonymous and
can only interact through a real-time chat in order to reach a joint decision. We elicit cognitive
abilities and risk attitudes on the individual and on the team levels, alongside a set of other
background measures. We also analyze the emotions of our decision makers as an additional
control. Individuals always bid against individuals on a market consisting of three bidders, and
team always bid against teams on a market consisting of three bidder teams, and this is common
knowledge among participants of the experiment.
We find that individuals are more prone to overbidding in first-price auctions and less likely
to bid their own valuation in second-price auctions. This is in line with our first expectation that
teams are more rational decision makers than individuals. Indeed, we can show that the significant
treatment effects vanish, as soon as we control for both cognitive ability and risk attitudes, in line
with our second expectation. Taken together, in these simple formats, teams are the better decision
makers in maximizing profits, which is in contrast to the existing results for more complex formats
(Cox and Hayne, 2006, Sutter et al., 2009). Our results provide a rationale for reconciliation of
the existing evidence for team decision making in auctions with the general picture that is painted
regarding team decision making. Teams are more rational decision makers, but there might be
forces such as increased complexity or strongly competitive environments in which teams fare
worse than individuals, potentially due to inherent problems of teams as decision makers such
as groupthink. Interestingly, we do not find any difference between individuals and teams in the
ascending English auction. However, our design is such that it was slightly tilted against auction
fever and groupthink, because we use a private value setup and a relatively slow-paced decision
making environment.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe the details of the
experimental design. Section 3 reports the results of our experiment. Section 4 discusses our
findings, and section 5 concludes the paper.
2Casari et al. (2016) look at a company takeover experiment that reports less overbidding by teams than by
individuals. Similarly, Sheremeta and Zhang (2010) study Tullock-contests, finding again less overbidding by teams.
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2 Experiment design
2.1 General structure and treatment variation
The experiment consisted of four parts. In the first part subjects participated in a series of auctions
(either first-price sealed-bid auctions or English auctions). In the second part they bid in one round
of a second-price sealed-bid auction. In the third part of the experiment subjects completed a risk
elicitation task, where they had to make an investment into a risky asset. It was followed by a
Raven’s matrices test in the fourth part to measure cognitive ability. Finally, we concluded the
experiment with a short questionnaire.
We varied our treatments in two aspects in a 2 × 2 factorial design. The first treatment
difference concerned the type of the auction in the first part of the experiment. In part 1 of the
FPA treatments, subjects participated in repeated first-price sealed-bid auctions. In part 1 of the
EA treatments, participants bid in repeated English auctions. The detailes of the rules of both
auction formats are explained in detail below.
The second treatment variation was the type of the decision-making entity. In IND treatments,
all subjects made their choices individually. In TEAM treatments, subjects made decisions in
teams of three. These teams stayed the same throughout all four parts of the experiment, but
subjects did not know the identity of the other team members. The decision making process within
teams was the same throughout all parts of the experiment: first, all three members of a team
made an individual proposal for their team’s bid in an auction (or an investment in part 3, or a test
answer in the Raven’s test in part 4). Afterward, if the individual proposals did not coincide within
a team, its members had to agree on a joint decision within a limited time. During this time, team
members could discuss their choices in a real-time chat. Once an agreement was reached within
each team, the experiment proceeded. If some team failed to agree on a joint decision within the
specified time frame, its members did not earn anything in the respective auction (or the respective
task in part 3 or part 4). To make the treatments more comparable in terms of deliberation, we
asked subjects in IND treatments to write a short explanation of their choice after they had made
it. While writing the explanation, individuals could also change their decision if they wanted so.
5
2.2 The rules of the experiment
2.2.1 Part 1: repeated first-price and English auctions
In the first part of the experiment, bidders participated in a finite number of repeated auctions. We
use the term “bidder” with respect to both individual bidders in IND treatments and team bidders
consisting of three subjects in TEAM treatments. In the beginning of each auction, bidders were
randomly matched into markets of three to bid for a virtual good. Bidders had independent private
values for the good, drawn from a uniform distribution on [0, 100] experimental currency points.3
After learning their private values, bidders submitted their bids for the good. As described above,
the bid submission process corresponded to individual bid proposals followed by a discussion in
TEAM treatments, and an individual bid choice followed by an explanation in IND treatments.
In the following, different auction rules in the FPA and EA treatments applied:
(1) In FPA treatments, bidders submitted their bids only once per auction. After all three bidders
on a market submitted a bid, the auction ended. The bidder with the highest bid on the
market won the auction and paid his own bid for the good. The payoff for the winner was thus
the difference between her own value and her bid. For teams it means that each member of a
team received the same payoff equal to the difference between the team’s value and the bid,
thereby facing exactly the same monetary incentives as bidders in IND treatments. Bidders
who did not win the auction got 0 points.
(2) In EA treatments, each auction consisted of several bidding rounds. In each round bidders
could either submit a bid higher or equal to the minimum bid in the respective round or
quit the auction (equivalent to submitting a bid of zero). The minimum bid in each round
amounted to the highest bid on the market in the previous round, referred to as current price,
plus an increment. The increment decreased with the current price level as laid out in Table 1.
The auction ended when only one bidder was left on the market. This bidder won the auction
and received a payoff equivalent to the difference between her valuation and her own bid from
the last round. In TEAM treatments this payoff was received by each member of the winning
team. As for the first-price auction, bidders who did not win the auction got 0 points.
3The members of the same team in TEAM treatments had the same values for the good so that teams did not
have more information than individual bidders in IND treatments.
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Table 1: Increment rule in EA treatments
Conditions Increment Minimum bid
current price ≤ 30 10 current price + 10
30 < current price ≤ 45 5 current price + 5
45 < current price ≤ 90 3 current price + 3
current price > 90 2 current price + 2
When an auction ended, the participants received feedback about winning or not winning the
auction and the price at which the good was sold. Then, the next auction started with exactly the
same rules as before. The markets were randomly re-matched, and the new valuations were drawn
(note that in TEAM treatments the composition of the teams remained the same). There were 12
auctions in FPA treatments and 8 auctions in EA treatments.4 Only one auction was selected as
relevant for payment at the end of the entire experiment. In the instructions we explicitly hinted at
the possibility of making losses if the winning bid exceeds the winner’s private value. The highest
possible bid in all treatments was 110 points.
2.2.2 Part 2: second-price auction
After finishing the first part, subjects participated in a one-shot second-price sealed-bid auction.
Since the optimal bidding strategy in the second-price auction is relatively straightforward and
boils down to bidding own private value, we consider bidding behavior in this part of the experiment
as a potential proxy for a bidder’s rationality.
Like in the first part of the experiment, bidders were matched into markets of three to bid for a
virtual good. In TEAM treatments subjects were bidding in the same teams as before. The values
were private, independent and uniformly distributed over [0, 100]. After all bidders submitted
their bids, the auction ended. The bidder with the highest bid on the market won the auction
and received her private value net of the second highest bid on the market. To avoid potential
income effects, we gave the participants feedback about the outcome of part 2 only at the end of
the experiment. We also explicitly hinted at the possibility of making losses if the second highest
bid on the market exceeds the winner’s private value.
4We conducted a different number of auctions in FPA and EA treatments merely due to time considerations.
English auctions on average took longer than first-price auctions.
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2.2.3 Part 3: risk elicitation task
In this part of the experiment subjects made a decision about an investment into a risky asset,
based on the approach of Gneezy and Potters (1997). As before, in IND treatments participants
made their choices individually, while in TEAM treatments they agreed on a common investment
within the teams.
Each decision-maker - individual or team - received an endowment of 100 experimental currency
points and could invest any amount r ∈ [0, 100] into a risky asset and keep the rest 100− r. The
return from the investment was either 2.5r or 0 with equal probabilities. When the decision makers
chose their investment r, the outcome was randomized and participants learned how much they
earned. As before, subjects in teams shared the same payoff, having exactly the same incentives
as subjects in IND treatments.
2.2.4 Part 4: Raven’s matrices test
The last part of the experiment was a short version of Raven’s progressive matrices test, aimed
at obtaining a measure of decision makers’ reasoning abilities. The test consisted of eight tasks
to identify a symbol that fits the given pattern (see Appendix B). The time for solving each
problem was limited to 90 seconds. If a decision maker managed to solve a problem correctly
within this time frame, she got 50 euro-cents for the solution (also implying 50 cents per team
member in TEAM treatments). If she submitted no answer or the answer was wrong, she did not
earn anything for the respective problem. Once the subjects went through all eight problems, they
learned how many of their answers were correct and how much they earned.
Finally, the participants filled out a short questionnaire and received feedback about their
earnings from the four parts of the experiment.
2.3 Laboratory protocol
The experiment was conducted in the experimental laboratory MELESSA at the University of Mu-
nich, Germany, using the experimental software zTree (Fischbacher, 2007) and the organizational
software ORSEE (Greiner, 2015). A total of 252 subjects, mostly undergraduate students, partic-
ipated in 14 sessions with 18 subjects each. Sessions in FPA treatments lasted about 90 minutes,
sessions in EA treatments took about two hours. Average earnings in the experiment amounted to
21.10 euros, including the show-up fee of 4 euros. Subjects received written instructions (see the
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Appendix) for each part of the experiment, after the previous part was finished. They knew that
there would be four parts from the beginning. We videotaped the subjects during the experiment
and used FaceReader emotion recognition software. All participants had to sign an extra consent
form for the video; there were no dropouts.
Since in TEAM treatments subjects were matched into teams of three, in part 1 and 2 there
were two markets with three team bidders each. In each round, six team bidders in one session were
randomly rematched into two markets, leaving us with one independent observation per session.
In IND treatment sessions there were six markets with three individual bidders. We reshuffled the
markets after each period within matching groups of six to keep the probability of facing the same
people on a market equal across treatments. Thus, in IND treatments we had three independent
observations per session. The subjects were aware of the matching protocol. We conducted two
sessions each in IND FPA and IND EA treatments, and five sessions each in TEAM FPA and
TEAM EA treatments.
3 Results
In this section we analyze the profits earned by bidders, different characteristics of bidding behavior
specific to first-price and English auctions, and market outcomes such as prices and the efficiency
of the auctions.
3.1 Realized profits
We start with analyzing actual profit that bidders earned in the auctions. By design, winner’s
profits in the first-price auction amount to the difference between their private values and their
bids. If a bidder did not win an auction, the profit was zero. Our data show that in first-
price auctions teams earned on average twice as much as individuals: 3.95 and 1.91 experimental
currency points, respectively (p = 0.0446; two-sided Wilcoxon rank sum test; N = 11). Figures 1a
and 1c show the average profit in first-price auctions and its dynamics over the twelve periods for
individuals and teams. What could be a possible explanation for this difference? We attempt to
answer this question by analyzing the effect of team membership on profits in first-price auctions
using panel regressions with random effects, with robust standard errors clustered on the matching
group level. We use the bidding behavior in the second-price auction, the amount invested into
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the risky asset, the Raven’s test score and several demographic characteristics as control variables.
It can be seen in Table 2 in the Appendix that being an individual bidder reduces the profit by
more than 2 points on average compared to team bidders. However, profit increases over time
for individuals, implying that individual bidders might learn and start to close the gap. Profit is
highly correlated with the performance in the second-price auction: if an average bidder bids closer
to the optimal strategy in the second-price auction, she earns significantly more in the first-price
auction as well. Bear in mind that the second-price auction takes place after experiencing the
first-price auctions; hence, causality cannot be established for this statement. There is a weakly
significant correlation of profits with risk attitudes (relatively less risk averse subjects earn more)
and, interestingly, gender also has a strong effect on profits: female participants on average earned
2.6 points less then male participants, controlling for everything else.
In contrast, in the English auction we find no difference between the profits earned by individ-
uals and teams. An average individual bidder in the English auction earned 6.23 points compared





















































1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Period
Individuals Teams

















1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Period
Individuals Teams
(d) English auction, by period
Figure 1: Profits earned by bidders
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(see Figures 1b and 1d). Regression analyses in Table 5 also show that there is no significant
treatment effect on profits in our English auctions. However, like in first-price auctions, there is
weak evidence of individual learning and a strong correlation between profits earned in the En-
glish auction with bidding behavior in the second-price auction. In addition, profit is positively
correlated with the self-reported high school math grade.
3.2 Bidding behavior
Bid shading is an important characteristic of bidding behavior in first-price auctions. We define
bid shading in FPA treatments as the difference between the private value and the submitted bid.
Thus, for the winners of the auction, bid shading is equivalent to the realized profit, while it also
provides information about the behavior of the bidders who did not win the auction. Figure 2a
shows that individuals on average bid 6.98 points below their valuation, and teams shade their
bids more – by 9.41 points. Using the most conservative test – a two-sided Wilcoxon rank sum
test on the level of independent observations – the difference is not significant due to the small

















































Figure 2: Bid shading in first-price auctions
This changes when we look at parametric results. We estimate regression models of bid shading
in Table 3, where the actual bid in the first-price auction is the dependent variable, regressed on the
private value of the good. The coefficient associated with the value of the good can be interpreted
as bid shading, which turns out to be slightly below 18% of the value in all specifications. The
regression specifications (1)-(3) show that there is a difference between bidding behavior of indi-
viduals and teams, that vanishes when we control for variables from other parts of the experiment
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in specifications (4)-(8). In line with the results from subsection 3.1, bid shading is negatively cor-
related with the deviation from rational behavior in the second-price auction. Moreover, bidders
with higher Raven’s test scores and better math grades submit lower bids, suggesting that general
intelligence matters for bidding strategy. Subjects with longer past experience of participating in
economic experiments also submitted lower bids in the first place. Risk aversion is associated with
slightly higher bids: more risk-tolerant bidders submit lower bids, thereby increasing potential
profit, but lowering the chance of winning. Finally, specifications (6)-(8) reveal that bids increase
over time in TEAM treatments, suggesting that teams might become more competitive over time.
Figure 2b shows that until period 7, average bid shading was higher in teams, but from period 7
on, there is little difference.
We have seen how bid shading differs across treatments, but how far away are the actual bids
from the optimal strategy in the first-price auctions? To answer this question, we predict optimal
bids using a simple parametric model with risk averse bidders. In this model, we assume that
bidders have a constant relative risk aversion utility function u(x) = x1−r/(1− r), where x is the
monetary payoff and r is the risk aversion parameter ranging from 0 to 1 (a higher r corresponds
to higher levels of risk aversion). We get a proxy for this parameter from the choices in the risk
elicitation task in part 3 of the experiment. The estimated average levels of risk aversion are
r = .07321 for individuals and r = .1721 for teams: teams were more risk averse than individuals,
but the difference is not significant.5 Using these estimates and the realized values for the good, we
predict optimal bid shading (value minus bid) for every bidder in every single auction. The optimal
bid shading is presented together with the actual bid shading in Figure 3. We observe that both
individuals and teams shade their valuations less, i.e. overbid compared to the prediction. This
is a common finding in the auction literature. However,the deviation from the rational bidding
strategy is more pronounced for the individuals (p = 0.1003; two-sided Wilcoxon rank sum test;
N = 11). A regression with individual bid shading as the dependent variable gives very similar
results as those in Table 3. Again, bidding in the second-price auction and Raven’s test scores
matter.
In contrast to the FPA treatments, we find no difference in bidding behavior of individuals and
teams in English auctions. One characteristic of bidding behavior specific to English auctions is
5In fact, this difference was purely due to a higher number of teams that chose to invest zero points into the
risky asset. We assumed r = 1 for those who did so, creating discontinuity in the parameter. Four out of 30 teams
invested nothing in this task, compared to one out of 36 individuals. If we exclude these observations, the difference
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Figure 3: Deviation from the estimated optimal bid shading in first-price auctions
the average number of rounds that bidders spend in an auction before they drop out. We observe
that teams stay slightly longer in English auctions: team bidders were on average active in 4.06
rounds per auction compared to 3.27 rounds for individual bidders. However, this difference is not
significant on conventional levels. Another characteristic of bidding behavior in the EA format is
the relative bid in each round. We define it as the ratio of the actual bid to the minimum bid in
the respective round. The average relative bids were not significantly different: they are 1.48 for
individuals versus 1.29 for teams.
3.3 Market outcomes: prices and efficiency
Given that the valuations were assigned randomly and independently, lower profits observed among
the individuals in FPA treatments implies that individuals paid higher prices than teams. Indeed,
in first-price auctions the average price for the good amounted to 65.34 points in IND treatments
compared to 59.32 points in TEAM treatments (p = 0.0679; two-sided Wilcoxon rank sum test;
N = 11). Average prices and their dynamics are depicted in Figures 4a and 4c. The regression
analysis (Table 4) lacks power to capture the treatment effect since the data have to be collapsed
on the market level; however, we still find the correlations between prices and control variables.
In line with the observed bidding behavior described above, prices are positively correlated with
the deviation from rational bidding in the second-price auction and risk aversion, and negatively
correlated with the score in the Raven’s test, high school math grade and previous experience of
participating in experiments.
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Figure 4: Realized prices
points (see Figure 4b). Although there is no difference on average over all periods, the development
of the prices was different in IND and TEAM treatments. As one can see in specifications (5)-(7)
in Table 6, prices paid by teams increased over time, while prices paid by individuals decreased.
This pattern is also reflected in Figure 4d.
Finally, we look at efficiency, which is an important variable for auction design. An auction
is defined as efficient if the bidder with the highest private valuation obtains the good. In FPA
treatments with individual bidders 78% of all auctions were efficient, while in TEAM FPA treat-
ments this share was 89%, the difference being not significant on conventional levels. Efficiency in
English auctions was almost the same in the two treatments and almost the same as in the IND
FPA treatment – slightly above 78%.
3.4 Emotions
Our experiment was recorded on camera and the facial expressions of the subjects were analyzed us-
ing the facial recognition software FaceReader. We focus here on investigating the role of emotions
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in FPA treatments because of the relatively simple structure of first-price auctions. In particular,
we were interested in the emotions experienced when the subjects saw their feedback screens at the
end of each period, on which they learned whether they won the current auction or not and how
much they earned. We expected the expressed emotions to have an effect on the future decisions
of the bidders in subsequent auctions.
Apart from a neutral facial expression, the software detects six basic emotions: anger, happi-
ness, surprise, disgust, sadness, and fear. Their magnitude was measured as a number between 0
and 1, captured multiple times per second. For each subject in each period, we took an average
over those measurements within the first ten seconds that the subjects saw their feedback screen
and used these measures for our analysis (synchronization between zTree and FaceReader was
achieved by employing the software µCap by Doyle and Schindler, 2019). An additional composite
variable “valence” amounts to the difference between measured happiness and the strongest neg-
ative emotion (anger, disgust, sadness, and fear). It reflects how positive or negative the overall























Figure 5: Valence of the emotions experienced by the subjects seeing their feedback screens in
FPA treatments
Our first interesting observation suggests that subjects in TEAM treatments experienced on
average more positive emotions than subjects in IND treatments (see Figure 5; p = 0.1003; two-
sided Wilcoxon rank sum test; N = 11). This could possibly be explained by the fact that teams
earned more on average and thus were more positive about the outcomes of the auctions. Another
potential reason could be an inherent preference for interaction in teams (Kocher et al., 2006). Our
TEAM treatments were likely to be more interesting for subjects due to the interaction through the
chat messages and the challenge of agreeing on a joint bid. This experience could have influenced
the overall satisfaction with the experiment.
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To test whether the measured emotions reflect plausible reactions to the outcome of an auction,
we checked whether different emotional states are correlated with winning or losing an auction in
the current period. Table 7 shows that winning an auction is associated with more happiness and
less anger, and respectively, a greater valence. Thus, we may conclude that facial recognition of
emotions worked properly in our experiment. Interestingly, individuals seem to experience a bit
more sadness than team members when not winning the auction.
The most interesting question lies in the potential impact of emotions on future bidding be-
havior. We evaluate this effect by estimating our regression models of bid shading with emotions
experienced in the previous period as control variables. The results are reported in Table 8. We
observe that two emotions are significantly correlated with bidding behavior in the next period.
First, if subjects experienced sadness, it had a negative impact on their next bid, i.e. they bid,
on average, closer to the rational prediction. One channel could be that winners were sad about
the small profit they made despite winning the auction; in the next round, they would adjust
their bids downwards to increase the expected profit. Second, the feeling of fear was positively
correlated with the bids in the next period. If a subject was afraid of losing the next auction and
ending up with zero profit, she might have overbid even more to increase the chances of winning
at least something. This logic is similar to risk aversion, supporting the literature that claims an
association between fear and risk-taking (Nguyen and Noussair, 2014). While the effect of sadness
would become weakly significant when controlling for the number of emotions covered (multiple
hypotheses testing), the effect of fear is robust. Interestingly, sadness and fear are emotions that
one would not associate with auction fever. Bear in mind, however, that a seal-bid first-price
auction is ex ante much less prone to auction fever than a fast-paced ascending English auction or
a descending Dutch auction.
4 Further analyses and discussion
The results of the experiment have shown that teams bid closer to the rational prediction in first-
price auctions, paying lower prices and earning larger profits than individuals, but we observe no
difference between team and individual bidding behavior in ascending English auctions. Why do
teams perform better in only one of the auction types? Although both auctions in our experiment
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Figure 6: Absolute deviation from rational strategy (value minus bid) in SPA
difference in the complexity of the optimal bidding strategies. In the English auction, the dominant
strategy is rather straightforward: a bidder should stay in the auction, as long as the minimum
bid does not exceed her private value, and drop out otherwise. In first-price auctions, however, a
bidder needs to figure out the best level of bid shading, taking into account the distribution of the
values, her own risk attitude, and risk attitudes of the competitors on the market.
We see that teams outperform individuals in this relatively complex decision-making environ-
ment. Our analysis suggests that this effect can be explained by differences in reasoning abilities
of teams and individuals: the performance in first-price auctions is correlated with the choices in
a second-price auction, i.e. smaller deviations from the dominant strategy in the latter lead to
less overbidding in the former. We consider the choices in the second-prices auction a measure of
reasoning ability, but we get similar results for the scores in a Raven’s test, the high school math
grade, and the previous exposure to laboratory economic experiments. Among those, the deviation
from rational bidding in the second-price auction is the most robust predictor of overbidding in
first price auction. Indeed, average second-price auction bids in TEAM treatments are closer to
the values than in IND treatments, see Figure 6. Non-parametric tests lack power to render this
difference significant, but the discrepancy in this proxy for rationality can predict the treatment
difference in FPA treatments, while it does not play a role in the relatively simple decision-making
environment of EA treatments.
One could ask whether the observed difference in first-price auctions could be partly attributed
to the fact that team members adapt their choices when they agree on a common strategy. In that
case we would see a difference between final bids and initial bid proposals that were submitted in-
dividually before entering the discussion in TEAM treatments. Figure 7 depicts initially proposed
bid shading along with actual bid shading (as mentioned in section 2, individual bidders also had
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the possibility to change their first choices). We see that the initial proposals are not different from
the final choice of both individuals and teams, suggesting that communication and agreeing on a
common strategy cannot fully account for the observed difference in behavior. Obviously, there
seems to be a component in team decision making that make individuals change their revealed
preferred decision already prior to the team interaction. Perhaps anticipated peer observation











































1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Period
proposal IND final IND
proposal TEAM final TEAM
(b) By period
Figure 7: Proposed and final bid shading in first-price auctions
Since auction experiments are inherently complex, we want to make sure that our results are
not driven by lack of understanding of the experimental setup. To tackle this issue, we check
whether there are bidders that consistently bid above their valuations, despite a clear statement
in the instructions that losses are possible in this case. Remarkably, in both TEAM treatments
we do not observe a single bid above the private values. Only in the IND FPA treatment there
are two subjects who always overbid and do not learn throughout the course of the experiment.
If we exclude those observations from the analysis, it does not qualitatively change our results.
However, the fact that we observe these outliers only in IND FPA treatment is interesting itself,
supporting our claim that individual bidders have a harder time to cope with complex auction
environments.
Apart from observing the realized profits and prices, unfortunately, there is not much more
to say about the bidding behavior in EA treatments. Typically, in a setting with independent
private values, both relative bids and the number of active rounds could be considered as a proxy
for rational behavior. The more subjects bid relative to the minimum possible bid, and the longer
they stay in an auction, the more competitive and the less rational their behavior often is. We
observe no significant difference between teams and individuals with respect to relative bids and
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the number of active rounds, but in our experiment these potential measures of rationality turned
out to be very noisy. Our EA treatments lasted about two hours, on average, and subjects might
have become a bit tired during the experiment, making this clear in the discussion stage. Thus,
there was a potentially perfectly rational motivation for both teams and individuals to bid higher
than the minimum bid and drop out faster in order to finish the experiment more quickly. This
property of our experimental setup might partly account for the absence of evidence for auction
fever on the side of the teams, contrary to the previous findings.
If a seller had the possibility to choose between the two auction types in our setting, first-price
auctions would be more profitable than English auctions, and vice versa for the bidders. The
revenue equivalence principle holds neither in IND nor in TEAM treatments, and realized prices
in first-price auction are significantly higher than in English auctions, as once can see on Figure 4
(p = 0.0014; two-sided Wilcoxon rank sum test; N = 22). This is partly explained by bidders’ risk
aversion that makes them bid higher in first-price auctions. However, as mentioned above, both
individuals and teams overbid in comparison to the theoretical prediction that takes risk aversion
into account, boosting the difference in profitability between FPA and EA treatments.
Finally, some specifications of the regression models allow us to draw inferences on the dynamics
of bidding behavior and auction outcomes. On the one hand, in both auction types we find that
the performance of individuals improves over time: for instance, individual profits increase in both
first-price and English auctions. We interpret this as learning, which is more pronounced among
individuals, since their average performance is poorer, than in teams and, therefore, there is more
room for improving the bidding strategy over time. On the other hand, in contrast to this pattern,
the bidding behavior of teams became less rational over the course of the experiment: team bids
in first-price auction and prices in English auction increased with the time. This deterioration
in performance supports the strand of the literature that shows that teams tend to behave more
competitively than individuals (as in Cox and Hayne, 2006, Sutter et al., 2009).
5 Conclusion
We have conducted an experimental study that systematically compares the bidding behavior of
individuals and unitary teams in different auction formats. Our results show that individuals
deviate more from the optimal strategy in first-price and second-price auctions than teams, while
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there is no difference between individual and team bidders in English auctions. The difference
in overbidding in first-price auctions between individuals and teams is strongly correlated with
bidders’ ability to make rational decisions, which we consider to be reflected in their bids in
second-price auctions and in their Raven’s cognitive ability test scores. In other words, teams
outperform individuals in first-price auctions, because they are more rational decision makers.
This finding challenges the results from the existing literature that showed that teams perform
worse than individuals in auctions (Cox and Hayne, 2006, Sutter et al., 2009) and it is in line
with the studies where teams outperform individuals in other decision-making environments (e.g.,
Casari et al., 2016, Sheremeta and Zhang, 2010, Sutter, 2005). We argue that the complexity of the
decision making environment matters for the observed difference in individual and team behavior:
since the optimal bidding strategy in first-price auction is more complex relative to our English
auction format, better reasoning abilities of the teams play a role in determining the difference
in first-price auctions, but not in our simple version of the English auction. Also contrary to our
expectations, we find no evidence for auction fever among teams in English auction, with this
result possibly being an artifact of our experimental setup with independent private values and
without time pressure.
Our paper is the first that systematically analyzes different auction formats with individual
and team bidders. Obviously, there are choices to make, when it comes to the experimental
design, and thus there is room and need for more research. First, one could investigate whether
more systematically varying the complexity of an auction affects the performance of individuals
and teams in a different manner. In our setting we found that teams outperformed individuals
in more complex auctions; however, the previous studies that observed teams performing worse
than individuals had even more complicated auction rules. How team and individual bidders
respond to exogenous variations in complexity of an auction, keeping everything else constant, and
whether the difference in bidding behavior is monotone in complexity, remains an open question.
Second, it would be interesting to learn about which auction features could potentially lead to
groupthink and over-competitiveness among teams, which were documented in some of the previous
studies. Our setup was clearly tilted away from groupthink phenomena. Introducing some (natural)
hierarchy could be an interesting avenue for future research. Our experiment also shows that an
ascending price is not enough for teams to exhibiting anything close to auction fever. Finding
the characteristics of an auction (potentially time pressure, face-to-face interaction, etc.) that
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trigger those reactions in teams and, hence, potentially deteriorate their performance, would be
an important aspect for auction design that we think requires more attention.
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Appendix A Regression tables
A.1 First-Price Auction
Table 2: Profits in FPA
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Individual -2.048∗∗ -3.486∗∗ -2.937∗∗ -2.559∗
(0.875) (1.509) (1.303) (1.345)
Period -0.0717 -0.0717 -0.0717
(0.0467) (0.0468) (0.0469)
Individual*Period 0.221∗∗ 0.221∗∗ 0.221∗∗
(0.110) (0.111) (0.111)












Constant 3.953∗∗∗ 4.419∗∗∗ 2.110 0.676
(0.197) (0.297) (2.547) (3.449)
Observations 792 792 792 792
R2 0.0152 0.0177 0.0892 0.106
GLS random effects regression. Robust standard errors in
parentheses (clustered on matching group level). ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 3: Bids in FPA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Individual 2.663∗ 2.719∗∗ 2.848∗∗ 2.164 1.237 4.584 3.693 2.781
(1.573) (1.382) (1.364) (1.439) (1.316) (3.453) (3.385) (3.255)
Value 0.824∗∗∗ 0.824∗∗∗ 0.826∗∗∗ 0.828∗∗∗ 0.828∗∗∗ 0.825∗∗∗ 0.824∗∗∗ 0.824∗∗∗
(0.0137) (0.0135) (0.0127) (0.0126) (0.0126) (0.0136) (0.0138) (0.0139)
Individual*Value -0.00117 -0.00384 -0.00819 -0.00780
(0.0260) (0.0258) (0.0260) (0.0264)
Period 0.242 0.242 0.242 0.402∗∗∗ 0.402∗∗∗ 0.402∗∗∗
(0.185) (0.185) (0.186) (0.123) (0.123) (0.124)
SPA error 0.130∗∗∗ 0.160∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗ 0.159∗∗∗
(0.0476) (0.0531) (0.0473) (0.0529)
Risk -0.0497∗ -0.0575∗ -0.0497∗ -0.0575∗
(0.0281) (0.0317) (0.0280) (0.0316)
Cognitive -1.600∗∗ -2.252∗∗∗ -1.590∗∗ -2.240∗∗∗
(0.653) (0.704) (0.658) (0.696)
Female 0.339 0.357
(2.220) (2.208)




Individual*Period -0.296 -0.296 -0.295
(0.337) (0.338) (0.338)
Constant -1.020 -1.051∗∗ -2.700∗∗ 9.291∗ 27.33∗∗∗ -3.682∗∗∗ 8.369∗ 26.38∗∗
(0.705) (0.418) (1.321) (4.997) (10.03) (1.022) (4.831) (10.25)
Observations 792 792 792 792 792 792 792 792
R2 0.836 0.836 0.837 0.852 0.860 0.838 0.852 0.861
GLS random effects regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered on matching group level).
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 4: Prices in FPA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Individual 4.842 5.422 6.717 4.613 1.743 0.191 -1.576
(3.521) (3.539) (4.376) (4.111) (4.438) (4.315) (4.238)
Value 0.831∗∗∗ 0.838∗∗∗ 0.870∗∗∗ 0.855∗∗∗ 0.828∗∗∗ 0.831∗∗∗ 0.820∗∗∗
(0.0548) (0.0536) (0.0595) (0.0583) (0.0392) (0.0412) (0.0400)
Individual*Value 0.00120 -0.0108 -0.0709 -0.0628
(0.0774) (0.0787) (0.0737) (0.0780)
Period 0.380 0.391 0.389 0.113 0.114 0.109
(0.292) (0.289) (0.290) (0.156) (0.156) (0.157)
SPA error 0.237 0.249∗∗ 0.232 0.242∗∗
(0.146) (0.116) (0.148) (0.119)
Risk -0.102∗ -0.108∗∗ -0.100∗ -0.106∗∗
(0.0576) (0.0462) (0.0570) (0.0457)
Cognitive -2.872∗ -4.358∗∗∗ -2.791∗ -4.279∗∗∗
(1.672) (1.568) (1.683) (1.578)
Female 0.684 0.677
(4.882) (4.864)




Individual*Period 0.486 0.484 0.492
(0.524) (0.525) (0.521)
Constant 19.76∗∗∗ 16.97∗∗∗ 37.74∗∗∗ 73.94∗∗∗ 19.15∗∗∗ 40.84∗∗∗ 77.11∗∗∗
(2.982) (3.343) (7.135) (16.71) (1.746) (7.634) (15.56)
Observations 264 264 264 264 264 264 264
R2 0.481 0.486 0.517 0.530 0.487 0.518 0.531
GLS random effects regression, data collapsed on market level. Robust standard errors in
parentheses (clustered on matching group level). ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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A.2 English Auction
Table 5: Profits in EA
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Individual -0.672 -3.885 -3.590 -4.134
(1.243) (2.399) (2.662) (2.700)
Period -0.304 -0.304 -0.304
(0.248) (0.248) (0.249)
Individual*Period 0.714∗ 0.714∗ 0.714∗
(0.380) (0.382) (0.383)












Constant 6.904∗∗∗ 8.274∗∗∗ 2.059 -1.333
(0.656) (1.565) (5.432) (7.501)
Observations 528 528 528 528
R2 0.000511 0.00372 0.0148 0.0208
GLS random effects regression. Robust standard errors in paren-
theses (clustered on matching group level). ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 6: Prices in EA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Individual -7.120 -7.226 -6.389 -6.843 15.98∗ 16.19∗ 15.43∗
(7.853) (8.024) (7.890) (7.777) (8.495) (8.555) (8.840)
Value 0.772∗∗∗ 0.780∗∗∗ 0.786∗∗∗ 0.781∗∗∗ 0.875∗∗∗ 0.875∗∗∗ 0.867∗∗∗
(0.155) (0.151) (0.155) (0.160) (0.0839) (0.0830) (0.0897)
Individual*Value 0.180 0.182 0.170 0.166
(0.170) (0.175) (0.182) (0.180)
Period 0.712 0.712 0.706 2.394∗∗ 2.393∗∗ 2.389∗∗
(0.745) (0.753) (0.759) (1.103) (1.114) (1.123)
SPA error -0.118 -0.137 -0.135 -0.152
(0.148) (0.155) (0.145) (0.152)
Risk 0.000663 0.0197 -0.00280 0.0158
(0.0857) (0.0929) (0.0838) (0.0897)
Cognitive 0.193 0.562 0.0950 0.491
(1.383) (1.707) (1.302) (1.677)
Female 5.495 5.706
(9.408) (9.634)




Individual*Period -3.099∗∗ -3.099∗∗ -3.101∗∗
(1.244) (1.255) (1.264)
Constant 10.02 6.413 5.713 -3.047 -6.110 -5.499 -13.41
(6.587) (6.736) (7.511) (23.46) (6.163) (9.997) (26.19)
Observations 176 176 176 176 176 176 176
R2 0.432 0.437 0.444 0.444 0.459 0.467 0.467
GLS random effects regression, data collapsed on market level. Robust standard errors in
parentheses (clustered on matching group level). ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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A.3 Emotions
Table 7: Emotions associated with winning an auction
Dependent variable
Neutrality Happiness Sadness Anger
Individual -0.0351 -0.0272 0.0144∗∗ 0.00985
(0.0271) (0.0176) (0.00709) (0.0125)
Winner -0.00843 0.0112∗∗ -0.00479 -0.00317
(0.00609) (0.00468) (0.00605) (0.00408)
Individual*Winner -0.00805 -0.00656 -0.000756 -0.0120∗∗
(0.0242) (0.0107) (0.0112) (0.00554)
Constant 0.650∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗ 0.0795∗∗∗ 0.0600∗∗∗
(0.0119) (0.00678) (0.00300) (0.00863)
Observations 1500 1500 1500 1500
R2 0.00519 0.00765 0.00508 0.00102
Dependent variable
Surprise Fear Disgust Valence
Individual 0.00633 -0.000877 0.00546 -0.0471∗∗
(0.00543) (0.000807) (0.00511) (0.0215)
Winner -0.00415∗ 0.000377 0.000776 0.0177∗∗∗
(0.00248) (0.00135) (0.00252) (0.00475)
Individual*Winner 0.00505 -0.000942 0.00661 0.000616
(0.00523) (0.00137) (0.00492) (0.0175)
Constant 0.0213∗∗∗ 0.00170∗∗ 0.00755∗∗ -0.0225∗∗
(0.00417) (0.000762) (0.00300) (0.0109)
Observations 1500 1500 1500 1500
R2 0.00485 0.00123 0.0111 0.0103
GLS random effects regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses
(clustered on matching group level).
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 8: The effect of emotions on future bids
Bid in FPA
(1) (2) (3)
Individual 2.884∗∗ 2.819 2.345
(1.391) (1.931) (1.810)
Value 0.827∗∗∗ 0.834∗∗∗ 0.835∗∗∗
(0.0124) (0.0135) (0.0136)
Individual*Value -0.00461 -0.00240 -0.00561
(0.0252) (0.0222) (0.0225)

















Constant -3.229∗∗∗ -1.898 6.479
(0.971) (1.468) (4.780)
Controls No No Yes
Observations 1512 1375 1375
R2 0.887 0.902 0.908
GLS random effects regression. Robust standard
errors in parentheses (clustered on matching group
level). ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Appendix B Instructions
Below we provide the instructions in TEAM FPA treatment (translated from German).
Welcome to the experiment and thank you for your participation!
From now on, please do not talk to other participants of the experiment.
General Information
This experiment analyzes economic decision-making. You can earn money in the experiment.
The earnings will be paid to you privately in cash after the experiment ends.
The whole experiment takes approximately two hours and consists of 4 parts. At the beginning
of each part, you will receive detailed instructions. The parts are independent of each other;
decisions made in one part will not affect your earnings in another part. The sum of your earnings
from the 4 parts will constitute your total payoff from the experiment. You will be informed about
your total payoff after completion of the fourth part, and it will be paid out to you in cash at the
end of the experiment.
If you have any questions after the instructions or during the experiment, please raise your
hand. One of the experimenters will come to you and answer your questions in private. For the
sake of linguistic simplicity, we only use masculine terms.
During the experiment, you and the other participants will be asked to make decisions. Some-
times you will interact with other participants. This means that your own decisions as well as the
decisions of other participants can affect your total payoff. This will be determined according to
the rules explained below.
A clock will run down in the top right corner of the screen while you make your decisions.
This informs you of how much time you still have to make your decision. Sometimes this time
restriction is binding and sometimes it is not. The details are explained below. The information
screens, on which you do not need to make any decisions, will disappear when the clock runs out.
Payments
In parts 1-3 of the experiment, the payoffs are expressed in points, not Euros. The points will
be converted into Euros at the end of the experiment. At the beginning of each part you will be
informed of the exchange rate for the conversion. In part 4, the payoffs are expressed in Euros.
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For having shown up on time, you will receive e4 in addition to the money that you can earn
during the experiment.
Anonymity
We only evaluate aggregated data from the experiment and never link names to the data from
the experiment. At the end of the experiment, you will be asked to sign a receipt regarding your
earnings, which serves only for accounting purposes and cannot be linked to your behavior in the
experiment. This experiment will be videotaped. The video records serve the research purpose of
the experiment. Just act natural.
Tools
You will find a pen on your table. Please leave it there when the experiment ends.
Groups
In the experiment, you will be a member of one out of six groups. Each group consists of three




The exchange rate in part 1 is: 3 Points = 1 Euro
Auctions
Part 1 consists of twelve independent auctions. In each auction, you bid in your group for
a good, which has a certain value for you and your group. For each auction, three groups are
randomly matched to bid for a good. We will call this a market (consisting of three groups with
three members each).
Each group member receives a one-time initial endowment of 10 points.
Value of the Good
Each group receives information about the value of the good at the beginning of each auction.
This value is determined independently for each group on a market; it means it is very likely that
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it will be different for different groups in the same auction. The value for each group is drawn
randomly between 0 and 100 points. Every value between 0 and 100 is equally likely (where 0 and
100 are also possible). Each bidder group knows its own value for the good but not the values of
the other two groups on the market.
Decision Making
In this part, each group will place a bid. Each group decides on a bid simultaneously. The
decision within the group is made in two stages:
In the first stage, you will be asked individually for a suggestion for the group bid. You have
30 seconds to enter a suggestion in the middle of the screen and click on “Next” button. After all
group members in your group have entered their suggestions, the second stage starts.
In the second stage, the group has 180 seconds to agree on a common decision. A decision is
considered valid only if exactly the same decision is entered by all three group members (you can
see the decisions of your group members in the right part of your screen). Within the 180 seconds,
all group members can modify their decisions as often as they want. You can also discuss your
decisions with the other group members – this discussion takes place in a chat window in the left
part of the screen.
The following rules apply for the chat: (i) conversation in German; (ii) no insults, threats
or similar violations of etiquette; (iii) no information that would allow to identify you (e.g. seat
number, name, gender, field of study etc.). If you break these rules, you will be excluded from the
experiment.
The chat should help you to coordinate within the group. If a group fails to reach a common
decision within 180 seconds, a bid of 0 will be assumed.
Bids must always be integer numbers. The highest possible bid is 110 points.
All information can also be found on the screen, which will look like this:
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In the upper area of the screen, you can see your identification number (ID) in your group (e.g.
“Your ID in your group is member 2”). Your ID will be retained for the entire experiment.
On the left side of the screen, you will see a chat window where you can exchange messages
with the other members of the group. To do so, enter your message in the purple field at the
bottom left and then press the enter key (Return/Enter). Your entry will be transmitted to the
computer and appear in the grey area of the window. The other participants in your group will
see your message and you will also see the messages of the other group members above the purple
input field. Important: If you want to send a message, press the enter key (Return/Enter) so that
the text you have written will appear in the grey area.
On the right side of the screen, you will see your group members’ suggestions for the bid. If
you choose to change your bid, you can do it in the center of the screen. Your bid will be changed
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when you enter a new bid in the input field in the middle and click on “Confirm” button. Then
your new bid will replace your previous bid on the right side of the screen.
Payoffs
The group with the highest bid among the three groups wins the auction. This group pays
their bid as the price for the good. Hence, each member in this group earns the following amount
in this auction:
Payoff for each group member = Value of the good – Bid of the group
For example: The three group bids are 80, 60, 40. The group which has bid 80 wins the auction.
Each member of the winning group receives the value of the good and pays 80 points.
If all three groups bid 0, the good will not be sold. If two or three groups have submitted the
same highest bid (greater than 0), it is determined randomly which group wins the auction and
pays for the good.
If a group does not receive the good in an auction, it does not earn anything in this auction.
However, each group member retains the initial endowment of 10 points (with one exception:
see below).
Feedback and Further Auctions
Once an auction ends, a new auction starts with exactly the same rules. There are in total 12
auctions in this part of the experiment. In each auction, the six bidder groups in the room are
randomly re-matched to form two markets. The three members of a group remain unchanged.
At the end of the experiment, one auction is randomly drawn as relevant for your payoff. Your
payoff from Part 1 is based on the points you have earned in this auction (it means: the value
minus the bid if your group won the auction; or zero if your group did not win the auction) plus
the initial endowment of 10 points.
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Attention!
You can also lose money in an auction. If your group wins an auction with a bid that is
above the value of the good, you are going to make losses! Losses are deducted from your ini-
tial endowment (and if it is not enough: from your earnings from the other parts of the experiment).




The exchange rate in part 2 is: 3 Points = 1 Euro
Auctions
Part 2 contains only one auction. In this auction, you bid in your group for a good, which has
a certain value for you and your group. Three groups are randomly matched again for the auction
and form a market to bid for a good.
Each group member receives a one-time initial endowment of 10 points.
Value of the Good
Each group receives information about the value of the good at the beginning of the auction.
This value is determined independently for each group on a market; it means it is very likely that
it will be different for different groups. The value for each group is drawn randomly between 0 and
100 points. Every value between 0 and 100 is equally likely (where 0 and 100 are also possible).
Each bidder group knows its own value for the good but not the values of the other two groups on
the market.
Decision Making
In this part, each group will place a bid. Each group decides on a bid simultaneously; there is
no repetition. The decision within the group is made in two stages:
In the first stage, you will be asked individually for a suggestion for the group bid. You have
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30 seconds to enter a suggestion in the middle of the screen and click on “Next” button. After all
group members in your group have entered their suggestions, the second stage starts.
In the second stage, the group has 180 seconds to agree on a common decision. A decision is
considered valid only if exactly the same decision is entered by all three group members (you can
see the decisions of your group members in the right part of your screen). Within the 180 seconds,
all group members can modify their decisions as often as they want. You can also discuss your
decisions with the other group members – this discussion takes place in a chat window in the left
part of the screen.
The following rules apply for the chat: (i) conversation in German; (ii) no insults, threats
or similar violations of etiquette; (iii) no information that would allow to identify you (e.g. seat
number, name, gender, field of study etc.). If you break these rules, you will be excluded from the
experiment.
The chat should help you to coordinate within the group. If a group fails to reach a common
decision within 180 seconds, a bid of 0 will be assumed.
Bids must always be integer numbers. The highest possible bid is 110 points.
End of the Auction
The group with the highest bid among the three groups wins the auction. The group pays the
second highest bid as the price for the good. Hence, each member in this group earns the following
amount in the auction:
Payoff for each group member = Value of the good – The second highest bid on the market
Example: The three group bids are 80, 60, 40; the group which has bid 80 wins the auction.
Each member of the winning group receives the value of the good and pays 60 points.
If all three groups bid 0, the good will not be sold. If two or three groups have submitted the
same highest bid (greater than 0), it is determined randomly, which group wins the auction and
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pays for the good.
If a group does not receive the good in an auction, it does not earn anything in this auction.
However, each group member retains the initial endowment of 10 points (with one exception:
see below).
Attention!
You can also lose money in this auction. If your group pays a price above the value of the good
(=when the second highest bid is higher than the value of the good and you win the auction),
you are going to make losses! Losses are deducted from your initial endowment (and if it is not
enough: from your earnings from the other parts of the experiment).
There is only one auction in Part 2.
Summary
Only two things change in comparison to Part 1:
• There is only one auction.
• The winner of the auction pays the second highest bid on the market for the good.




The exchange rate in part 3 is: 40 Points = 1 Euro
Each group member receives 100 points. Your group can invest any amount between 0 and 100
points (0 and 100 are also possible) in a risky asset and keep the rest. We denote the amount of
points that your group invests in the risky asset as R. With a probability of 50%, the amount R
is multiplied by 2.5; with a probability of 50%, the amount R is lost. Each group member receives
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from their investment either 2.5 × R or nothing with the same probability. Each group member
keeps the amount 100−R that was not invested.
Decision Making
The decision within the group is again made in two stages, with the group being the same as
in parts 1 and 2.
In the first stage, you will be asked individually for a suggestion for the amount R to be
invested. You have 30 seconds to enter a suggestion in the middle of the screen and click “Next”
button. If you do not make a suggestion before the time is up, you will be automatically taken to
the second stage without a suggestion.
In the second stage, the group has 120 seconds to agree on a decision on the amount R to be
invested. A decision is considered valid only if exactly the same decision is entered by all three
group members (you can see the decisions of your group members in the right part of your screen).
Within the 180 seconds, all group members can modify their decisions as often as they want. You
can also discuss your decisions with the other group members – this discussion takes place in a
chat window in the left part of the screen.
The following rules apply for the chat: (i) conversation in German; (ii) no insults, threats
or similar violations of etiquette; (iii) no information that would allow to identify you (e.g. seat
number, name, gender, field of study etc.). If you break these rules, you will be excluded from the
experiment.
The chat should help you to coordinate within the group. If your group fails to reach a common
decision in 120 seconds, you will not earn any money in part 3.
After a valid decision, the computer will simulate the investment and you will find out how
much you have earned.
Part 4
In this part, we ask your group to solve 8 problems. All of them have the same structure.
You see a box with a matrix, i.e. a rectangular pattern of different symbols. Each matrix has
3 rows and 3 columns. The symbol in the lower right corner is missing. Below the matrix, there
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are 6 symbols to choose from. Only one of them fits into the pattern and should replace the empty
field. Here is an example.
The correct solution is “Number 5”. The task for your group is to identify the correct symbol.
Once you are done with one problem, the next problem will appear on the screen. You cannot go
back to the previous answers once you have submitted a solution. For each correct solution, each
group member receives 50 Cents. If the answer is wrong, you will not get anything.
The decision within the group is again made in two stages:
In the first stage you will be asked individually for a suggestion for the correct symbol. You
have 30 seconds to enter a suggestion in the middle of the screen and click “Next” Button. If you
do not make a suggestion before the time is up, you will be automatically taken to the second
stage without a suggestion.
In the second stage, the group has 60 seconds to agree on the correct symbol. A decision is
considered valid only if exactly the same decision is entered by all three group members (you can
see the decisions of your group members in the right part of your screen). Within the 60 seconds,
all group members can modify their decisions as often as they want. You can also discuss your
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decisions with the other group members – this discussion takes place in a chat window in the left
part of the screen.
The following rules apply for the chat: (i) conversation in German; (ii) no insults, threats
or similar violations of etiquette; (iii) no information that would allow to identify you (e.g. seat
number, name, gender, field of study etc.). If you break these rules, you will be excluded from the
experiment.
The chat should help you to coordinate within the group. If your group fails to reach a common
decision in 60 seconds, you will not earn any money for the respective problem.
At the end of part 4, you will learn how many problems your group has solved correctly.
Before we pay out your earnings to you in cash, we ask you to fill out a short questionnaire.
Then the experiment ends.
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